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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 16575
and 16738

-vsMARVIN WHITTENBACK and
JOHN JOSEPH PARRETT,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants appeal from a jury verdict finding
them guilty of the offense of Theft, in violation of
and § 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated (1953)

§

76-6-404

as amended.

The

charge was based on appellants' exercise of unauthorized
control over the property of another with the intent to deprive
him of his property.

The property stolen was cash in an amount

exceeding $250.00 but less than $1,000.00.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants were tried before a jury on March 29, 1979,
in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Honorable George E. Ballif,

presiding.

Pursuant to the it

verdict, Judge Ballif sentenced both appellants to an

ind~

minate term not to exceed five years imprisonment in the u:
State Prison.

Appellant Whittenback was sentenced on June

1979 and appellant Parrett was sentenced on October 12, 19:
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the convictions m
sentences of each appellant, as well as affirmance of the
District Court orders denying appellants' Motion to Suppre:
evidence and denying their motions for directed verdict

a~

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 28, 1978, Officer Craig Geslison of the
Provo City Police Department responded to a request that he
investigate suspicious persons at the Pine View Apartments
Provo (R. 146) .

1

Officer Geslison encountered the appellfil

as the suspects of the suspicious person report and aftera
two-hour investigation found marijuana and a bag of coins:
appellants' vehicle (R. 155, 160).

No arrest was made at

that time(R. 155).
At about 1:00 a.m. on March 26, 1979, Officer Gi

1

Citations to the transcript of the Hearing on appellant 5
Motion to Suppress and the Transcript of Trial are he~
referred to by the page of the Record (e.g. R.l) ·
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was patrolling an area of Provo in which there had been
several thefts from businesses

(R. 147, 53).

He was alerted

to the prior criminal activity by reading a Police Department
''speed letter" which stated that more patrolling was needed
in the area because of the recent thefts (R. 158).

Officer

Geslison noticed the appellants, whom he recognized from the
previous encounter, within an all-night laundromat called
"The Wash Hut".

(R. 55, 56).

His attention was drawn to them

by his previous encounter with them, the fact that they were
the only individuals in the laundromat, and his knowledge that
they resided in Salt Lake City ( R. 147, 56).
After calling for assistance, Officer Geslison
entered the Wash Hut and asked appellants what they were doing
and for identification (R. 56, 147).

Appellant Parrett

responded that they were in Provo visiting his ex-wife, but
claimed he did not know where his ex-wife lived (R. 147).
Officer Geslison then asked who owned the vehicle
parked in front of the Wash Hut.
that it was his car (R. 57, 148).

Appellant Parrett responded
When asked if the officer

could search the car, appellant Parrett responded "Yes," or
"Yes, you can go ahead and search it."

(R. 58, 148) .

Officers

Michael Mock and Bradley Leatham arrived and were instructed
by Officer Geslison to search the vehicle (R. 147-148, 57-58,
166, 182).

-3-
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While the other officers searched the car, and
pursuant to his observation of "bulges" in the appellants'
pockets and of two "ace'' lock picks on the floor under
appellant Whittenback's seat, Officer Geslison asked the
appellants to empty their pockets

(R.

AppeL

58, 149-150).

Parrett emptied his pockets immediately, but appellant
Whittenback asked what authority the officer had for this
request

lR.

58, 149).

Officer Mock then re-entered

t~

Wash Hut, having completed the search of the vehicle, and
placed both appellants under arrest for possession of
tools

(R. 80, 149, 184).

bm~

Appellant Whi ttenback emptied hi:

pockets after being placed under arrest (R. 149).
The officers found a large amount of quarters an:
dimes

(the denominations required to operate the machines:

the Wash Hut)
153).

in appellant Whittenback's pockets.

(R. 58,

They also found that appellant Parrett' s pockets co:

tained a key ring with a key on it which Officer Geslison
recognized as being the type used to open washing machines
(R.

60-61, 64, 152-153).

Pursuant to their search of the

vehicle, Officers Leatham and Mock found two "Valley Ba~·
bags containing a large amount of quarters and dimes, seve:
machine keys, an "ace" lock pick with instructions, and a:
of needle-nose pliers.

They also found several other mach:

keys, a white sock full of dimes, and a screwdriver withE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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altered head (R. 76-79, 86, 153-154).

Approximately $596.00

in coins was found either on appellants' persons or in the
vehicle (R. 78, 66, 153).
William Victor Oldroyd, the owner of the Wash Hut,
was notified by the police officers of the theft on March 26,
1979 and went to the Wash Hut at that time (R. 27-28).

Mr.

Oldroyd determined that the coin boxes on fourteen washers and
two dryers had been opened (R. 30-31) .

He then counted the

money remaining in the machines that had not been tampered
with and estimated that roughly $600.00 to $800.00 was missing
(R. 31-32, 39, 48).

Mr. Oldroyd also successfully opened several

of the washing machines and dryers with one of the "ace" lock
picks found in appellants' possession (R. 32-33).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INITIAL INQUIRY OF APPELLANTS WAS
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION OF
CRIMINAL CONDUCT AND WAS THUS PERMISSIBLE.
Appellants contend that the initial entry into the
Wash Hut and questioning of appellants by Officer Geslison
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in that the officer did not have a reasonable
suspicion that appellants were engaged in criminal conduct.
Respondent rejects this contention and submits that when the

-5-
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facts and circumstances are viewed in light of Officer
Geslison's knowledge, the officer was justified in making
the initial inquiry and questioning of appellants.
The case of Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), up:
which appellants rely, established that a police officerrn:
detain and question a person based on information which fa:
short of establishing probable cause to arrest the person.
The facts of Terry are similar in many respects to the cas,
at bar.

There, an experienced Cleveland Police

Officer,~

patrolling on foot, had his attention attracted to two per:
who repeatedly walked up and down a street pausing to look
into a particular store window each time they passed.
officer suspected that they might be "casing" the store

The
~

contemplation of a possible robbery and thus approached thE
individuals to question them.

When they gave evasive answE

the officer also frisked them for weapons.
In upholding both the stop and the frisk, the
United States Supreme Court wrote:
. there is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search or seize
against the invasion which the search
or seizure entails.
. And in justifying
the particular intrusion, the police
officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.
392 U.S. 1, 21.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Court reserved the issue of when a seizure would be
justified for purposes of detention and/or interrogation,
Terry, supra, n. 16.

In that footnote the Court observed:

Obviously, not all personal
intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves "seizures" of
persons.
Only when the officer,
by means of physical force or show
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen
may we conclude that a "seizure"
has occurred.
392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16.
Respondent submits that in the case at bar, Officer
Geslison's initial entry into the Wash Hut and preliminary
questioning of appellants did not constitute a sufficient
show of authority nor a restraining of appellants' liberty
to constitute a "seizure."

Thus, the protections of the

Fourth Amendment do not apply to this initial encounter.
In the case of People v. DeBour, 352 N.E.2d 562
(N.Y. 1976), the Court of Appeals of New York recognized that
in

s~me

circumstances police officers may approach persons

to conduct a preliminary inquiry on facts falling short of
the "reasonable suspicion" standard of Terry, supra.

In

Debour, two police officers, while walking down a street soon
after midnight, noticed an individual walking towards them
on the same side of the street.

-7-

When the person got within
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thirty feet of the officers he quickly crossed the street.
The officers also crossed and asked the defendant what he
was doing in the area and for identification.

Observing

a bulge under defendant's jacket, the officers asked him to
unzip his jacket, which he did, revealing a loaded

revolv~

in his waistband which the officers seized.
In holding that this conduct did not constitute
a "seizure" the Court wrote:
This case raises the fundamental
issue of whether or not a police officer,
in the absence of any concrete indication
of criminality, may approach a private
citizen on the street for the purpose of
requesting information. We hold that he
may.
The basis for this inquiry need not
rest on any indication of criminal activity
on the part of the person of whom inquiry
is made but there must be some articulable
reason sufficient to justify the police
action which was taken.
352 N.E.2d 562, 565.
In deciding a companion case, People v. LaPene, the court
indicated how this analysis fits with the ''reasonable
standard:
. We bear in mind that any
inquiry into the propriety of police
conduct must weigh the interference
it entails against the precipitating
and attending conditions.
By this
approach various intensities of police
action are justifiable as the precipitating and attendant factors increase
in weight and competence.
The minimal
intrusion of approaching to request
information is permissible when there
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sus~

is some objective credible reason for
~ha~ in~erference not necessarily
indicative of criminality (People v.
De Bour, supra). The next degree, the
common-law right to inquire, is activated
by a founded suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot and permits a somewhat
greater intrusion in that a policeman is
entitled to interfere with a citizen to
~he exte~t necessary to gain explanatory
information, but short of a forcible
seizure.
Where a police officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that a
particular person has committed, is
committing or is about to commit a felony
or misdemeanor, this authorizes a forcible
stop and detention of that person.
352 N.E.2d 562, 571-572.
Thus, all that is required for an initial confrontation between
police and citizens in public places is an articulable,
objective reason for the inquiry.
In the case at bar, Officer Geslison had at least
sufficient knowledge to justify his entry into the Wash Hut,
his preliminary questioning of appellants, and his asking
them for identification, under the De Bour standard.

In

State v. Larson, Wash. App., 587 P.2d 171 (1978), the court
applied the De Bour rationale to a factual situation similar
to the instant case.

In Larson, officers saw several people

in a car parked in a no-parking zone in a closed park late
at night in an area in which many burglaries had recently occurred.

The officers approached the car and asked each occupant
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

for identification.

As the defendant opened her purse to

obtain identification, the officers saw and seized a bag of
marijuana from the purse.

In upholding the trial court's

denial of defendant's motion to suppress this evidence, the
court stated:
While the presence of individuals
wandering abroad late at night or at an
unusual hour should not of itself precipitate a police investigation, it is
a circumstance justifying suspicion .
Taking it in combination with factors
such as the defendant's being seated
in a car parked in a no-parking zone
near a closed park in an area, where
numerous burglaries had occurred previously, police suspicion of illegal
conduct was justifiable.
Under such
circumstances, the police may ask for
identification .
587 P.2d 171, 172-173.

See also State v. Warner, Ore., SB:

P.2d 681 (1978) at 689.
Here, Officer Geslison knew that there had been
several thefts committed in the area of the Wash Hut (R. 1:
he knew that the appellants were alone inside the laundrorna
he knew from a previous encounter with appellants that

tt~

were from Salt Lake City and that they had on the prior
occasion been in possession of contraband and a bag full o:
coins (R. 66, 147, 155, 160).

This gave him at least an

"objective credible reason" to enter the laundromat, a pubi
place where he had a right to be and to ask appellants wh~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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they were doing and for identification.

There was no seizure

or detention of appellants to this point, since the officer
did not restrain their freedom to leave.

Rather, Officer

Geslison's conduct constituted mere "threshold questioning"
of the appellants.
416

People v. Gurule, Colo., 471 P.2d 413,

(1970).
In the recent case of State v. Marks, Kan., 602

P.2d 1344

(1979), the Supreme Court of Kansas recognized that

where an officer does not stop a moving vehicle, but merely
approaches the defendant sitting in a parked vehicle there is
no detention of the defendant and hence no seizure.

In the

case at bar, there was also no "stopping" of the appellants
since they were stationary in a place of public business at
the time when the officer approached.

Since appellants did

not even have the immediate capability of moving when first
approached, as did the defendant in Marks, supra, if there
was no ''seizure" there, there certainly was no seizure in
this case.
Even if this Court finds that Officer Geslison's
conduct constituted a "detention" or "seizure" of the appellants,
such conduct was justified under the "reasonable suspicion"
standard of Terry.

Since Terry, most courts have recognized

that:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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. the governmental interest in
effective crime prevention underlies
the recognition that a police officer
may in appropriate circumstances and
in an appropriate manner approach a
person for investigating possible
criminal behavior, even though there
is no probable cause to make an arrest.
People v. Mangum, Colo., 539 P.2d 120, 123 (1975)
added).

See also State v. Post, 573 P.2d 153

(emphasis

(Idaho 1978):

State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977); United Statesy
:Seek, 598 F. 2d 497

(9th Cir. 1979).

Thus, the Terry standa.

::::': "reasonable suspicion" applies to detentions to investis
possible criminal activity.
In State v. Folkes, supra, this Court recognized
that:
When a police officer sees or hears
conduct which gives rise to suspicion of
crime, he has not only the right but the
duty to make observations and investigations to determine whether the law is being
violated; and if so, to take such measures
as are necessary in the enforcement of the
law.
565 P.2d 1125, 1127.

The Court also reiterated the test af

in Utah as to the propriety of searches and seizures:
It is to be borne in mind that it
is not all searches and seizures without a warrant which are proscribed by
the constitutional provisions referred
to.
It is only of a search which is
"unreasonable." It is commonly and
properly stated that the question as to
whether a search is unreasonable depends

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

upon the particular circumstances; and
the question to be answered is whether
reasonable and fair minded persons would
judge the alleged search or seizure to
be unreasonable or oppressive.
565 P.2d 1125, 1127.

When viewed in the light of this test,

Officer Geslison's conduct in approaching and questioning
the appellants was not only ''reasonable," but was based on
articulable facts giving him reasonable suspicion to believe
appellants were engaged in a crime.

In such a situation, the

officer has a duty to make an investigation into the circumstances.

The facts within Officer Geslison's knowledge,

detailed above, clearly distinguish this case from cases cited
by the appellants where officers were found to have no reasonable suspicion for an initial stop or detention (e.g. In re
Tony C.,

582 P.2d 957

(Cal. 1978) cited at p.9 of Appellants'

Brief) .

It is simply not true, as appellants assert, that all
. that the appellants were from

Officer Geslison knew was

out-of-town, that they were in an all-night establishment late
at night, and that they were doing laundry."
at p.17.

Appellant's Brief

He also had within his mind the information gained

from the previous encounter with appellants and the information
that several businesses in the area had recently been burglarized.
The initial encounter between Officer Geslison was lawful and
did not violate appellants' Fourth Amendment rights.

-13-
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POINT II
THE REQUEST TO APPELLANTS TO EMPTY
THEIR POCKETS, ASSUMING IT WAS A
"SEARCH," WAS JUSTIFIED AS INCIDENT
TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
Appellants assert that Officer Geslison' s request
that they empty their pockets was an unlawful search.

Altl

the case law is sparse on this subject, it seems that a r&
from an officer to a suspect that the latter empty his poc!
C.oes c::::istitute a "search."

United States v. DiGiacomo, 5·

F.2C.. 1211 (10th Cir. 1978); State v. Garcia, 493 P.2d 975
(N.M. App. 1972).

c

Assuming that the request in this case

constitute a "search," respondent submits that as to both
appellants the search was proper as incident to a lawful

M

based on probable cause.
Respondent agrees with appellant that the basic
standard for arrest without a warrant was set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 1:
This Court has adopted that standard in State v. Hatcher,:
Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259

(1972), wherein the test is sta:

as follows:
The determination should be made
on an objective standard: whether from
the facts known to the officer, and
the inferences which fairly might be
drawn therefrom, a reasonable and
prudent person in his position would
be justified in believing that the
suspect had comrr,itted the offense.
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495 P.2d 1259, 1260.
2d 129, 499 P.2d 276

See also State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah
(1972).

In addition, this Court has

stated often that the determination as to whether the arrest
is based on probable cause is primarily for the trial court
and will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly in error.
State v. Eastmond, supra,; State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah
197 6) .
The propriety of a warrantless search incident to
a lawful arrest was recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).

This

Court has also recognized this exception to the general
requirement of a warrant for conducting a search.

State v.

Eastmond, supra; State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978).
It has also been widely recognized that even though the search
itself precedes the formality of an arrest, the search is still
incident to arrest if at the time of the search the officer
had sufficient probable cause to make the arrest.
Means, 581 P.2d 406
36

State v.

(Mont. 1978); People v. Terry, 454 P.2d

(Cal. 1969); State v. Carroll, 526 P. 2d 1238 (Ariz. 1974),

in which the Arizona Court held there is no constitutional right
to be arrested before a search.

In State v. White, supra,

this Court wrote:
. if such probable cause for arrest
exists independent of any evidence obtained as a result of the search, the

-15-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fact that the search was conducted before
the arrest does not invalidate the search
nor preclude its characterization as being
incident to arrest.
577 P.2d 552, 553.
Applying these rules to the facts of the case at
bar, first, Officer Geslison had probable cause to arrest
appellants before he requested them to empty their pockets.
As shown in POINT I, supra, he had reasonable suspicion to
believe they were committing a crime as he entered the laur.
and

sues~ioned

appellants.

Subsequent to the questioning,

Officer Geslison noticed bulges in all four of appellant
~~

Whittenback's pockets as well as two lock picks of the

used to open the coin boxes on washing machines resting oo
the floor below where Whittenback was sitting.

(R.

58, 14:

This observation verified his earlier suspicion that appeL
were stealing money and gave him objectively verifiable
probable cause to arrest appellants before he asked them tc
empty their pockets, cf. Post v. State, 563 P.2d 1193 (Okl.
Cr. 1977).
Second, as to appellant Parrett, the search was
complete before Officer Mock returned from searching the
vehicle and placed appellants formally under arrest.

Howe·

since a search preceding arrest may be incident thereto

~

long as the searching officer had probable cause to arrest.
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in this case that search was incident to the arrest.

The

search of appellant Whittenback was not completed until
after the formal arrest and thus does not present the
preceding-search problem (R. 149).
Finally, it is well-established that the scope of
a search incident to arrest extends to anything unlawfully
within the suspect's possession.
906

State v. Jackson, 539 P.2d

(Ariz. 1975); Agnello v. United States, 296 U.S. 20 (1925)

[fruits of crime]; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(197 3).

Thus, since the search here produced coins from the

washing machines and a machine key with which the crime was
committed, the search was not unduly broad (R. 58, 60-61, 64,
152-153).
POINT III
THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE WAS PURSUANT
TO CONSENT AND WAS THUS LAWFUL.
Appellants argue that the search of their car was
unlawful because it was undertaken without a warrant and not
pursuant to any exception to the requirement of a warrant.
Respondent submits that the threshold question to be answered
regarding this issue is whether or not appellants have
standing in this Court to challenge the legality of the search.
It has been generally recognized that a defendant
has no standing to challenge the legality of a search on appeal
where he has no possessory or proprietary interest in the
-17-
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premises searched.

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257

(1960); State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978).
recent case of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128

In the
t~

(1978),

United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that a
defendant has standing whenever a search is "directed" at
him.

The Court stated that the issue was not really whethE

a defendant has standing, but rather is a question of

"su~

stantive Fourth Amendment doctrine" which must be answered
in light of traditional principles of defendant's
privacy interest in the premises searched.

reason~

439 U.S. 128, '.

The relevant inquiry, then, is whether or not appellants ha
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded area.

i

they did not, their Fourth Amendment rights were not violat
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.

347

(1967).

In Rakas, supra, the Court dealt with this issue
the factual context of a search of a car.

In 'holding that

petitioners had no property or possessory interest in the
portions of the car searched, the Court recognized that

t~

expectation of privacy as to an automobile is less extensh
than that pertaining to a house or apartment.

(See e.g.

~

v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
In the case at bar, appellants may not challenge
legality of the search both because they had no legitimaU
expectation of privacy in the automobile and because they
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had no possessory or proprietary interest in the car.

In

Rakas, supra, the Court recognized that use of a vehicle
with the consent of the owner does not establish an expectation of privacy in that vehicle. 439 U.S. 128, 148.

It is

clear from the record in this case that the vehicle searched
was not registered to either of the appellants (R. 187).
Nothing in the record shows that appellants had a legitimate
interest of privacy in the car.
As to appellants' contention that the search was
not lawful, respondent submits that the search of the car was
justified under both the automobile exception and the consent
exception to the warrant requirement.

The automobile exception

to the warrant requirement was recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925):
[T]he guaranty of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures
by the Fourth Amendment has been
construed, practically since the
beginning of the government, as
recognizing a necessary difference
between a store, dwelling house, or
other structure in respect of which
a proper official warrant may readily
be obtained and a search of a ship,
motor boat, wagon, or automobile for
contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant,
because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought .
. The measure of legality of

-19-
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such a seizure is, therefore, that
the seizing officer have reasonable
or probable cause for believing that
the automobile which he stops and
seizes has contraband .
. therein .
267 U.S. 132, 153-156.

The Court later recognized in

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) that for constitutional purposes, there is no difference between seizing thE
car at the scene and waiting for a search warrant and

im~

searching the car at the scene.
This Court has adopted the position that where a
vehicle retains a reasonable degree of mobility and office:
have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains

contr~

or evidence of a er ime, the search may be made immediately
without a warrant.

State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (1978), St1

v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405 , 503 P.2d 848

(1972).

Applying this rule to the facts of the instant ca
it is clear that Officers Geslison, Leatham, and Mock
probable cause to believe the appellants' vehicle

h~

conta~~

both the fruits and instrumentalities of the crime.

Off~

Geslison's knowledge establishing probable cause for

arre~

of the appellants is detailed, supra, in POINT I.

When to

that knowledge is added his recollection that in his previ(
encounter with appellants, the investigating officers fo~
marijuana and a bag of coins in appellants' vehicle, pr~c
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cause to believe appellants' vehicle contained contraband
and evidence of crime is established (R. 160).

Although

Officer Geslison did not personally conduct the search, but
rather directed Officer Mock and Leatham to do so, this does
not destroy the probable cause.
591 P.2d 1354

In State v. Groda, Ore.,

(1979), the Oregon Supreme Court held:

. [T)he searching officer
personally must have information
which constitutes probable cause,
or the searching officer must be
directed to make the search by
an officer who personally has that
knowledge.
591 P.2d 1354

(emphasis added).

In addition, the exigency of mobility of the car
was present in this case.

If the car was not searched or

seized at the scene it could have been freely moved out of
the jurisdiction of the officers either by appellants or
others.

In Chambers, supra, it was recognized that if the

officers could seize the car and search it later, they can
also search it immediately at the scene of the crime.
Appellants' argument that the automobile exception is not
available in this case is based solely on the case of Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443

(1971).

Coolidge is inapposite

here because on the facts there the searching officers had no
reason to believe the car might contain contraband or evidence
of crime.
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Finally, the search of appellants' car was conducted pursuant to freely given consent of appellant

Pu~

It has long been recognized that officers may conduct a
warrantless search where the defendant consents to such a
search.

See e.g. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.

Vale v. Louisiana,

399 U.S.

30

(1970).

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S.

218

347 (19C

In the case of
(1973}, the Unitec

States Supreme Court, reaffirming that a warrantless conse
sear2h is valid, held that the prosecution has the

burd~

establishing from the totality of the circumstances
consent was voluntarily given.

that~

However, the prosecutioni

not required to prove that the defendant knew of his righ:
to refuse to consent in order to show voluntariness.
U.S.

218,

233-234;

412

248-249.

It has also been held that:
. the fact of custody alone
has never been enough in itself to
demonstrate a coerced confession or
consent to search.
United States v. Watson,

423 U.S.

411, 425

(1976).

This:

has held in accordance in State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 57, ~
P.2d 772

(1969)

and State v.

White,

See also United States v. Shields,

577 P.2d 552
573 F.2d 18

In People v. Havhurst, Colo.,
the Colorado Supreme Court,

(Utah lg:

(10th Cir.

571 P.2d 721 (191'

in upholding a search as beir.c
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consensual, delineated several factors which taken together
may show lack of duress or coercion.

Those factors include:

1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the
officers, 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the
officers,

3) a mere request to search, 4) cooperation by the

owner of the vehicle, and, 5) the absence of deception or
trick on the part of the officers.
Respondent submits that each of the factors in
Hayhurst, supra, are also present on the facts of the case
at bar.

At the time when Officer Geslison asked appellants

for permission to search the car, all he had done was ask
them for their identification and ask preliminary questions.
(R.

178) .

Appellants were not in custody at the time and

although Officers Mock and Leatham arrived before consent
was given, Mock did not enter the Wash Hut (R. 182) and
Leatham entered just as consent was being given (R. 166),
thus, the presence of additional officers did not create an
undue show of authority.

When Officer Geslison requested

permission to search, he did not claim any authority to
search or deceive appellants into thinking he had a search
warrant (R.

57-58, 148).

He simply asked if the appellant

Parrett would consent to the search, to which Parrett responded
"Yes," or "Yes, you can go ahead and search it."

(R. 58, 148).

Finally, none of the officers used force or threats of force

-23-
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to obtain the consent.
Under the totality of circumstances test, these
facts establish that the respondent met its burden of prov:
that the consent given by appellant Parrett to search the'.
was voluntary.
POINT IV
THE STATE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT THE AMOUNT OF MONEY TAKEN
BY APPELLANTS EXCEEDED $250.00
Appellants aver that there was no substantial
competent evidence adduced at trial to establish that the
value of the property stolen was more than $250. 00 but les;
than $1, 000. 00.

However, appellants attempt in their Brie:

to confuse the issue by comparing proof of the amount of c
stolen with proof of the value of other types of
which have independent market value.

proper~

Respondent rejects t

analogy and respectfully submits that this element of the
crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt by substantial
competent evidence.
The cases appellants cite which discuss the

~~

of evidence necessary to prove value of property which has
an independent market value are inapposite here.

This is

because cash does not have independent market value, but
rather the value of cash is its face value.

See United St:
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Constitution, Article I, Section 8, and Knox v. Lee, 79
457

(1870) The Legal Tender Cases.

u.s.

The only issue which must

be proved in a case in which cash was stolen is the amount
thereof, since the value is fixed by Congress.
Respondent agrees with appellants that:
[T]he weight of evidence and the
credibility of witnesses are reserved
exclusively for the jury, and this
Court will not interfere unless the
evidence is found to be so lacking and
insubstantial that reasonable men could
not possibly have reached a verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977).
the Interest of M. S., 584 P.2d 914
Romero, 554 P.2d 216

(Utah 1976).

See also State in

(Utah 1978); State v.
The State here introduced

the testimony of William Victor Oldroyd, the owner of the
Wash Hut, as to how much money was stolen by the appellants
from his establishment.

Mr. Oldroyd established that he went

to the Wash Hut at the request of the police on March 26, 1979
at about 1:00 a.m.

(R. 28).

He found that 14 of his 50 washing

machines had been broken into as well as 2 of his 25 dryers
(R.

28-31) .

Those machines that had been broken into had no

coins in them at all

(R. 32).

Mr. Oldroyd, after counting the

money remaining in the other machines, determined that to
the best of his knowledge $600.00 to $800.00 was missing from
the machines

(R.

32, 38, 47-48).

-25-

He also established that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

most of the machines generate approximately the same

am~M

of money (R. 32).
When this testimony is tested in light of the fa:
that Mr. Oldroyd had owned and operated the Wash Hut for
twelve years, it is clear that this was substantial compet,
evidence of the amount of money taken (R. 27) •

Further, t:

total amount of money found in appellants' possession was
almost $600.00, corroborating Mr. Oldroyd's "guess" and
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that more than $25C.
was taken by appellants

(R.

66, 78, 153).

In a similar case, State v. Swanson, 440 P.2d 4S:
(Wash. 1968), the defendant was charged with grand

larce~

which required proof that he stole property of more than I:
in value.

The owner of the service station testified that

amount missing was $104.00, based on his counting of thec
left in the cash register.

The Washington Supreme

Court~

that this evidence was sufficient to make out the "value"
element of the crime.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, respondent respectfully submits t
the initial contact between the officers and the appellant:
the "search" of appellants' pockets, and the search of the
vehicle, were all reasonable under all the circumstances,
set forth above.

Thus, appellants' Fourth Amendment right
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were not violated in this case.

In addition, the State of

Utah proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants stole
property having a value of over $250.00 but less than $1,000.00.
For these reasons, and based on the argument herein, respondent
requests that appellants' convictions and sentences be affirmed
as well as the orders of the lower court denying appellants'
motions to supress evidence, for a directed verdict, and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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